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What Counts as Fraud?
An Empirical Study of Motions To Dismiss
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale*
June 2004; MTDArticle19.doc
Abstract: This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to
dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions on motions to dismiss in securities
class actions by district and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases
filed after the passage of the Reform Act to the end of 2002. These circuits are the
leading circuits for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as
representing two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the Second
Circuit applies the least restrictive pleading standard to securities claims and the Ninth
Circuit applies the most restrictive.
The Ninth Circuit’s post-PSLRA reputation as being a tougher venue in which to
win securities fraud class actions is born out by a significantly higher dismissal rate. The
differences between the two circuits are also reflected in factors that correlate with
dismissal. For example, allegations of violations of accounting principles other than
revenue recognition correlate negatively with dismissal in the Second Circuit. This
coefficient, however, is insignificant in our regressions for the Ninth Circuit. Allegations
of revenue recognition violations are insignificant in both circuits, whether or not the
issuer has been forced to restate those revenues. The circuits part ways on other factors
as well: the Second Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss cases with allegations of
false forward- looking statements, a surprising result given the stringent standards for
such statements imposed by the PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit is significantly less likely to
dismiss complaints with allegations of ’33 Act violations and the Second Circuit is more
likely to dismiss cases brought by the Milberg Weiss firm. When it comes to insider
trading, however, the two circuits are both skeptical and the allegations correlate with
dismissal in both circuits.
Keywords : Securities litigation, accounting fraud, insider trading.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
What counts as fraud in securities class actions? Who wins and who loses?

These questions are obviously important to the lawyers who specialize in this area, as
well as the corporate officers and directors whose firms are targeted by these suits. But
the questions are also important to Congress, the SEC, and other policymakers and
academics considering the deterrence and governance roles played by securities fraud
class actions.
To date, little rigorous empirical investigation has been brought to bear on these
questions. Most of the efforts to answer these questions analyze appellate court cases or
tally up numbers of lawsuits or settlement values.

Extrapolating from cases is the

traditional mode of legal scholarship and it can shed insights on many issues. Our study
adds to those works by utilizing regression analysis to provide a more complete picture of
how this litigation works on the ground.
The dearth of solid empirical work on securities fraud class actions did not chill
legislative initiatives in this area in the 1990’s.

Despite the lack of solid data on

securities fraud class actions, Congress decided that the field was ripe for reform. The
initial lobbying force behind the PSLRA was the accounting industry. Over time, hightech industry leaders, lawyers, and other frequent defendants of such class actions joined
forces with the accountants. 1

The concern voiced most frequently by these interest

groups was that frivolous class action complaints were being filed largely for settlement
value. 2 Reform proponents claimed that a simple drop in a company’s stock price would

1

See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s
Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 Wash. U. L. Q. 537, 555 (1998) (discussing
reform movement and participants).
2
See id. at 552-53.

2
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result in the filing of a complaint that, in turn, would provide leverage for settlement
given the time and risk entailed in contesting such claims. 3 Settlement pressure also
resulted from expensive discovery demands, and reform proponents argued that nonmeritorious cases were settled simply to avoid the costs of litigation. 4
Although the evidence on these claims was decidedly mixed, 5 Congress generally
accepted the arguments in adopting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PSLRA”). 6 The PSLRA erects a series of procedural barriers to securities fraud cases
intended to discourage meritless suits and reduce the cost of defending class actions.
President Clinton vetoed the legislation, expressing the view that it would deter
meritorious cases of fraud, but Congress overrode his veto. 7
Congress’s enactment of the PSLRA is simply the first step in the effort to crack
down on securities fraud class actions. Judicial interpretation and application of the
PSLRA’s provisions will have much to do with how the law affects issuers and investors.
The process of interpretation is particularly important for the PSLRA because Congress
left its cornerstone provision purposefully vague, because it could not reach agreement on
a more determinate formulation. 8 Not surprisingly, that vagueness has led to divergent
interpretations of the PSLRA in the courts. 9 Do those divergent interpretations lead to
different outcomes?

3

See id. at 553-54.
See id. at 553-54.
5
See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. Dav. L.Rev. 903, n. 57 (2000) (discussing and citing
articles debating arguments underlying the PSLRA).
6
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.).
7
See 141 Cong. Rec. H15,214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
8
See Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627, 652-660 (2002) (describing tacit
“agreement to disagree” over the PSLRA’s pleading standard).
9
See id. at 667-675 (collecting cases).
4

3
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To answer that question, this paper examines how judges are implementing the
PSLRA’s barriers to suit. Specifically, we study the resolution of motions to dismiss
under the PSLRA. The PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event for corporate
issuers. Until the motion to dismiss is resolved, the PSLRA’s discovery stay prevents the
plaintiffs from obtaining discovery to flesh out the allegations of their complaint. 10 Thus,
plaintiffs’ lawyers must construct their claims of fraud out of the issuer’s past filings with
the SEC and press releases. Moreover, the absence of discovery means that the expense
of litigation will be manageable for the issuer. If the corporation fails to get the case
dismissed, however, it must suffer through an expensive and time-consuming airing of its
potentially dirty laundry through the discovery process. Worse yet, the corporation faces
the specter of potentially ruinous damages if the case goes to trial (particularly for those
cases that are strongest on the merits). Both risk ave rsion, and, of course, the possibility
that fraud actually occurred, ensure that securities fraud class actions rarely go to a jury. 11
Cases that are not dismissed on a motion to dismiss or at summary judgment, and that
survive class certification, invariably settle. Understanding the determinants of motions
to dismiss, therefore, is a crucial piece in understanding how securities fraud class actions
operate in the real world.
We proceed as follows. Part 2 provides background on securities fraud class
actions and the objectives of the PSLRA.

Part 3 develops a series of hypotheses

regarding the determinants of outcomes of motions to dismiss in securities fraud class

10

Exchange Act §21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(3).
Black et al. were able to find one securities case that went to trial in the last ten years. Bernard Black et
al., Outside Director Liability, Working Paper No. 250, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, at
33 (2003).
11

4
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actions. Part 4 presents the results of our empirical tests of those hypotheses. Part 5
concludes.
Our findings reveal some similarities and some differences between the two
circuits. We find that the law matters – the Ninth Circuit’s post-PSLRA reputation as a
tougher venue in which to win securities fraud class actions is born out by the data, which
shows a significantly higher dismissal rate in that circuit.

Somewhat surprisingly,

allegations of revenue recognition violations are insignificant in both circuits, whether or
not the issuer has been forced to restate those revenues. The two circuits take a similar
approach to insider trading, which correlates with dismissal in both circuits.
The two circuits part ways, however, in their approach to other allegations
commonly found in securities fraud complaints. For example, allegations of violations of
accounting principles other than revenue recognition correlate negatively with dismissal
in the Second Circuit, but this coefficient is insignificant in our regressions for the Ninth
Circuit. The Second Circuit is significantly less likely than the Ninth to dismiss cases
with allegations of false forward-looking statements, a surprising result given the
stringent standards for such statements imposed by the PSLRA.

We conclude that

plaintiffs’ lawyers are being more selective in making such allegations, in contrast to less
precisely targeted allegations tied to insider trading. In addition, we find that the Ninth
Circuit is significantly less likely to dismiss complaints with allegations of ’33 Act
violations than the Second Circuit is. But, the Second Circuit is more likely than the
Ninth Circuit to dismiss cases brought by the Milberg Weiss firm.

II.

BACKGROUND
REFORM ACT

TO

THE

PRIVATE

SECURITIES

LITIGATION

5
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The plaintiffs’ and defense bar (along with outside observers) agree that the
PSLRA makes it more difficult to plead a securities fraud complaint that can survive a
motion to dismiss. 12 The PSLRA addressed these cases in various ways, including two
that we focus on here: heightened pleading standards for securities fraud complaints and
actual-knowledge standards for forward-looking statements.

A.

The Pleading Standard
The main focus of our study is the effect of the heightened pleading standard.

Most securities fraud class actions allege that the defendants violated section 10(b)13 and
Rule 10b-5 14 of the Securities Exchange Act (“10b-5 claims”). In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, the Supreme Court rejected a negligence standard for 10b-5 claims, instead
holding that plaintiffs alleging such claims must prove that the defendants acted with
scienter. 15 Scienter requires that the defendant have acted at least recklessly in making
the misstatement. Thus, to state such a claim, the plaintiff must plead that the defendant
made a material misstatement or omission, with scienter, and that she was injured by her
reliance on that misstatement or omission. 16
In their attempts to apply the scienter standard to complaints alleging 10b-5
claims, the circuits developed diverse pleading standards based on Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b) departs from the general rule of notice
pleading17 by requiring that allegations of fraud be made “with particularity,” but

12

Richard H. Walker, David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The New Securities Class Action: Federal
Obstacles, State Detours, 39 A RIZ. L. REV. 641 (1997).
13
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
14
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
15
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
16
Id. at 197.
17
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring that complaint provide only short and plain statement of claim).

6
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allowing state of mind to be “averred generally.”18 The two circuits we study, the Second
and the Ninth, took very different approaches to the pleading standard. Consistent with
the language of Rule 9(b), before the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit had developed a
heightened pleading standard allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter generally, but
demanding particularity in alleging all other elements of securities fraud. 19
By contrast, the Second Circuit required plaintiffs to plead the state of mind with
particularity. Prior to the PSLRA, the Second Circuit had held that plaintiffs could meet
the scienter standard in one of two ways. First, plaintiffs could plead that the defendants
had the motive to commit fraud and the opportunity to do so. 20 Although simplistic
allegations of motive that could apply generally, such as keeping one’s job, 21 were
insufficient to meet the standard, other allegations of specific financial gain from a
transaction were sufficient to state a claim. 22 Second, plaintiffs could meet the standard
with circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or conscious behavior. 23 Generally,
this standard required plaintiffs to plead contemporaneous facts, conditions, or statements
to show that the defendants knew or should have known that the alleged misstatement
was misleading when made. 24

18

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
See In re Glenfed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
20
754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
21
See In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D. Conn. 1994).
22
See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that allegations that defendants
bullish statements to market were connected to significant stock sales met motive and opportunity test).
23
See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir.
1996) (requiring plaintiffs seeking to meet recklessness standard to provide higher level of detail than that
required under motive and opportunity test).
24
See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d. Cir. 1994) (rejecting allegations of fraud where
plaintiffs failed to contrast public disclosure with contemporaneous internal document or data).
19

7
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In the PSLRA, Congress resolved this split by rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s
approach and adopting a heightened pleading standard that drew on the Second Circuit’s
approach. 25 The “strong inference” provision requires that:
In any private action arising under this title in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. 26
Although it is now clear that plaintiffs must plead scienter with particularity, it remains
unclear how much detail is required to meet that particularity standard. The legislative
history can be fairly read to require a standard equivale nt to the then-existing Second
Circuit standard or, potentially, a higher standard still. 27 The combination of confusing
legislative history and the fact-based nature of securities fraud claims has resulted in
different pleading standards across the circuits. 28
Consequently, courts have struggled to apply the heightened pleading standard to
various allegations of fraud. In this Article, we examine the effect of the PSLRA’s
heightened pleading standard as applied to decisions resolving motions to dismiss by
courts within the Second and Ninth Circuits. We focus on these circuits for two reasons.
First, these two circuits far outpace the others in the number of securities fraud claims
litigated. 29 Second, the two circuits have interpreted the pleading standard in divergent
ways, with the Ninth Circuit now recognized to have the most stringent pleading standard

25

See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1993), reprinted in 1995-96 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 746-47 (1995, codified at Exchange Act §21D(b)(2), 15
U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2)).
27
See Sale, supra note __; Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __.
28
See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __, 668-669.
29
See Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Case Filings, 2003: A Year in Review, at 13
(reporting an average of 51 filings per year in the Ninth Circuit and 37 per year in the Second Circuit from
1996 to 2003; the next highest circuit (the 11th ) averaged only 20 per year over the same period) (2004).
26

8
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in the country, and the Second Circuit believed to have the least stringent. 30 These
differing standards may lead to differing treatment of similar types of allegations. 31

B.

The Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
We also analyze the PSLRA provision creating a separate liability standard for

“forward- looking statements.”32

This standard grew out of the “bespeaks caution”

doctrine developed by the courts. Under this doctrine, courts would not hold defendants
liable for financial projections and other forward- looking statements if those statements
were accompanied by cautionary language to warn investors that the predictions might
not bear out. If the warnings were sufficiently tailored, courts applying the “bespeaks
caution” standard concluded that the forward- looking statements were immaterial, and
thus, not actionable, even if false. 33

30

See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note __, at 671.
A brief description of the conflicting standards may be useful to readers not familiar with this debate.
The Second Circuit relied on the legislative history and held that the PSLRA codified its pre-PSLRA
pleading approach. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2000). The Second Circuit has, however, refined
its explication of the standard post-PSLRA. Now, rather than a two-prong test, the Second Circuit has set
forth a list of the general types of allegations that will meet the heightened pleading standard for scienter.
Synthesizing its own case law on the pleading standard, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs can plead a
strong inference of fraudulent intent by including sufficient allegations that the defendants: received
concrete, personal benefits from the alleged fraud; participated in deliberately illegal behavior; knew or had
access to facts “suggesting” that the public statements were inaccurate; or “failed to check information they
had a duty to monitor.” See id. at 311. This refined standard, of course, still leaves room for pleading
based on motive and opportunity.
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the PSLRA repudiated that court’s old standard,
which did not require that state of mind be pleaded with specificity. In interpreting the “strong inference”
provision, the court also relied on the PSLRA’s legislative history, but concluded that the statute raised the
standard above that of the Second Circuit. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974
(9th Cir. 1999). Under this higher pleading standard, the court rejected allegations based on motive and
opportunity and on recklessness. Id. Instead, to meet its new pleading standard for scienter, plaintiffs had
to plead, “at a minimum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or conscious
recklessness.” Id.
32
See Exchange Act §21E(c), 15 U.S.C. §78u-59(c).
33
See, e.g., Kaufman v. Trump’s Castle Funding, 7 F.3d 357, 371-372 (3rd Cir. 1993) (explicating and
applying “bespeaks caution” doctrine).
31

9
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In the PSLRA, Congress created a liability standard for forward- looking
statements more restrictive than the standard for 10b-5 claims.

Forward- looking

statements are now protected by a safe harbor. To circumvent that safe harbor, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendants making the statements did so with actual
knowledge of their falsity. 34 Although the statute does not speak directly to the pleading
standard for these claims, it does state that complaints must “state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.”35 Further, even if the plaintiff successfully pleads actual knowledge, the statutory
safe harbor bars the claim if the alleged misstatement was accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language. 36 As a result, courts often subject these statements to more exacting
scrutiny than other general allegations of misleading statements or omissions. 37
In adopting these reforms, Congress was attempting to reduce the liability
exposure of issuers, accountants, and investment bankers by making securities fraud
cases more difficult to litigate. Operationally, the PSLRA’s principal barrier is making
complaints more difficult to plead. The success of any reform to the litigation process,
however, will depend both on the work of the courts in implementing those reforms and
the responses of attorneys to those reforms. In the next part, we develop our hypotheses
regarding the effect of the PSLRA on the litigation and resolution of securities fraud class
actions.

III.

HYPOTHESES

34

Exchange Act §21E(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1)(B).
Exchange Act §21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78t-5(b)(2).
36
Id.
37
See Hockey v. Medheker, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
35

10
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In this part of the article, we develop a series of hypotheses concerning the
resolution of motions to dismiss in securities fraud class actions. We sort our hypotheses
into three categories. The objective of our first set of hypotheses is to determine whether
allegations commonly included in securities fraud complaints correlate with the outcomes
of motions to dismiss those complaints, and, by inference, whether these allegations
influence judges who must decide these motions. How well do plaintiffs’ attorneys tailor
their complaints to judges’ expectations? The objective of our second set of hypotheses
is to determine whether variations in the applicable legal standard lead to different
outcomes. Thus, the first two sets of hypotheses attempt to capture the impact of the
heightened pleading standard and the heightened liability standard for forward- looking
statements on litigation. Our third set of hypotheses focuses on whether the identity of
the law firm bringing the claims has an effect on the outcome.

A.

Type of Allegations
As discussed above, Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the PSLRA was to

discourage weak or frivolous securities fraud suits. The “strong inference” pleading
requirement discussed above is the key mechanism Congress deployed. Earlier work
studying the effects of the PSLRA has found that plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to
satisfy this requirement by alleging that defendants have violated accounting principles. 38
A typical allegation states that the firm and its managers ignored generally
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), provided numbers not supported by those

38

PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000 Securities Litigation Study, www.10b5.com. (2000); see also Robert B.
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Reflections on Federalism: Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance, 54
Vand. L. Rev. 101 (2003) (analyzing key allegations in complaints filed in Second, Ninth, and Third
Circuits).

11
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principles and, thereby, intentionally misled the investing public. This type of allegation
provides an intuitive basis from which to infer scienter. Rules, after all, are meant to be
followed; if they are not, a court could conclude that the defendants were knowingly
making misleading statements about the firms’ financial situation.
Allegations that the defendants inflated reported revenues may provide
particularly salient evidence of scienter, implying that the defendants wanted the
company’s prospects to look better than they actually were.

The strength of these

allegations is likely to vary with the evidence that accounting principles have been
violated.

Restatements arguably offer particularly tangible evidence to judges of a

misstatement by the company.

Courts may draw stronger inferences from alleged

violations of GAAP if the firm’s auditors or the SEC have required it to restate its
revenues. A restatement will only be required if it is concluded that prior financial
statements were materially misleading, thus satisfying a central element for a 10b-5
claim. An allegation of an accounting violation without an accompanying restatement
may provide a weaker inference. Similarly, allegations that defendants have violated
accounting principles other than revenue recognition may provide a still weaker basis for
inferring fraudulent intent. This analysis suggests a continuum of accounting allegations.
Accordingly, we test three separate hypotheses involving accounting violations:
H1:

Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints with allegations that the firm has
restated revenues.

H2:

Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints with allegations that the
firm has misled investors in recognizing revenues.

H3:

Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints with allegations of
violations of GAAP other than revenue recognition.

12
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Post-PSLRA complaints contain other types of common allegations, though we
believe the courts may perceive those allegations to be weaker than accounting
allegations.

For example, the increased prevalence of option-based compensation

schemes in recent years has made it much easier to allege claims using insider trading as
the motive from which scienter can be inferred. Moreover, the trades of officers and
directors are publicly available, and therefore readily included in complaints.

Such

claims have in fact increased. 39
The theory behind these claims is that options, and stock ownership in gene ral,
may provide an incentive for management to temporarily inflate stock prices in order to
liquidate their holdings. But stock and option compensation has been so prevalent, it is
also likely that there are few cases in which insider trading cannot be alleged. As a
result, if plaintiffs do not exercise restraint in making such allegations, courts may
discount claims relying on insider trading as an indicator of scienter – despite the
intuitive plausibility of such conduct as a motive for fraud. Indeed, prior work suggests
that courts are highly skeptical of such allegations 40 and that the allegations are not
correlated with complaints surviving a motion to dismiss. 41 Accordingly, our fourth
hypothesis is that:
H4:

Courts are more likely to dismiss complaints using insider trading to support
the scienter allegations.

39

See Sale, Judging Heuristics, supra note __, 924-34 (collecting and analyzing opinions discussing insider
trading allegations).
40
See id, supra note __ (showing increased rejection of insider trading claims and developing heuristics
court deploy in dismissal).
41
Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? Class Actions under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Working paper, June 2004) (finding no association between
measure of abnormal insider trading and insider trading allegations).

13
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Plaintiffs can also satisfy the scienter requirement with other allegations of motive
to commit fraud. 42 An offering of securities by the corporate defendant, either in the
form of a public or private offering or a merger in which stock is used as the
consideration, is a commonly pleaded motive for fraud. 43 For example, the plaintiffs
might allege that the defendants made a misstatement to keep the stock price high in
order to pursue or complete a strategic combination, or that the defendants made a
misstatement in order to prime the market for their offering.

Our fifth and sixth

hypotheses are that:
H5:

Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints when the issuer has offered
securities during the class period.

H6:

Courts are less likely to dismiss complaints when the issuer is negotiating a
merger or has one pending during the class period.

B.

Legal Standards
Differences in the substantive law that judges apply to the complaints may also

affect the likelihood of dismissal. Prior to the PSLRA, plaintiffs based many claims on
assertions that companies had released misleading financial projections or other forwardlooking statements. 44 As discussed above, the PSLRA raised the pleading requirement
for all allegations, but the statutory safe harbor raises the standard of proof, and arguably
the pleading standard, for claims based on forward- looking statements. 45

As a

42

This is true in most circuits, including the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2nd
Cir.), cert denied, 121 S. Ct. 567 (2000). The Ninth Circuit, however, purports to reject allegations of
scienter based on “motive and opportunity.” See In re Silicon Graphics Securities Litig., 183 F.3d 970
(1999).
43
See Sale, Judging Heuristics, supra note __, n162 (discussing use of merger and offering allegations by
plaintiffs in complaints and judicial responses in motions to dismiss).
44
Jennifer Francis, Donna Philbrick and Katherine Schipper, Shareholder Litigation and Corporate
Disclosures, 32 Journal of Accounting Research 137 (1994).
45
Securities Act §27A, 15 U.S.C. §77z-2; Exchange Act §21E, 15 U.S.C. §78u-5.

14
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consequence, courts may be particularly reluctant to allow allegations based on forwardlooking statements to survive a motion to dismiss, leading to our seventh hypothesis:
H7:

Courts are more likely to dismiss complaints based on forward-looking
statements.
The anti- fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (which apply only to

public offerings of securities) differ substantially from Section 10(b) the Exchange Act
(which applies to fraud in connection with any purchase or sale of securities).

In

particular, Section 11 of the Securities Act provides for strict liability for corporate
issuers who have made a material misstatement in a registration statement. 46 Section
12(a)(2) provides a negligence claim for misstatements in a prospectus. 47

Although

plaintiffs must meet other hurdles to succeed with these claims, 48 the PSLRA’s increased
pleading standard for claims based on a particular state of mind was included only in the
amendments to the Exchange Act, not the Securities Act. 49 Nonetheless, some courts
have held that when these Securities Act claims are pleaded in the same complaint with a
10b-5 claim, the entire complaint “sounds in fraud” and is subject to the heightened
pleading standard of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 50 As a result,
those courts have dismissed the Securities Act’s strict liability and negligence claims
along with the 10b-5 claim. Others have, however, refused to adopt this approach,
holding that because the Securities Act claims do not require scienter, they are not subject

46

15 U.S.C. §77k.
15 U.S.C. §77l(a)(2).
48
For a full explication of these claims and their litigation, see Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a
Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 Washington Law Review 429 (2000).
49
Compare Exchange Act Section 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2) (requiring complaints to “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind”) with Securities Act Section 27, 15 U.S.C. §77z-1 (imposing no pleading requirements).
50
See, e.g. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 364(2nd Cir. 2004).
47
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to a heightened pleading standard and should be allowed to proceed. Accordingly, our
eighth hypothesis lacks a predicted direction:
H8:

Courts are less/more likely to dismiss complaints that include claims brought
under the Securities Act of 1933.

C.

Identity of Counsel
Another factor that may influence outcomes on motions to dismiss is the identity

of class counsel. During the period of our study, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach was by far the largest law firm specializing in securities fraud class actions,
appearing as counsel in the majority of those suits. 51 Bill Lerach, one of the firm’s bestknown partners, gained notoriety during the PSLRA debates, with his boast (repeatedly
cited by proponents of reform): “I have the greatest practice in the world. I have no
clients.” This publicity is not likely to raise one’s reputation with judges. Consequently,
judges familiar with the reputation of the Milberg Weiss firm may be skeptical of the
claims that it brings, making complaints filed by that firm particularly susceptible to
dismissal.
On the other ha nd, Milberg Weiss does more securities litigation than any other
plaintiffs’ firm. Its economies of scale may make it the firm best suited to adapt its
pleadings and conform to or even anticipate shifts in the case law. 52 It may also have
greater resources to invest in pre-complaint investigation, which might enhance its ability
to plead with particularity. Consequently, its complaints may be more likely to survive
dismissal. We therefore do not have a predicted direction for our ninth hypothesis:

51

The firm has subsequently split in two, with the East and West Coast offices going their separate ways.
Bloomberg News, Millberg Weiss Becomes 2 Firms (May 4, 2004).
52
See Elliot J. Weiss, Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5, 10-16 (2001) (analyzing the
“creative drafting” of Milberg Weiss’s Silicon Graphics complaint); id. at 27-44 (analyzing additional
complaints by Milberg Weiss).
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H9:

Courts are more/less likely to dismiss claims brought by Milberg Weiss.

IV.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We turn now to our empirical tests of the hypotheses developed in Part III. We

begin by describing our sample selection. We also present descriptive statistics for the
variables that that we use to capture the effect of different factors on litigation outcomes.
We then discuss the results of our regression analyses.

A.

Sample selection and descriptive statistics.
Our sample consists of decisions in the Second and Ninth Circuits ruling on

motions to dismiss in securities fraud class actions. Using exhaustive searches on Lexis
and Westlaw, as well as various reporters and websites, we collected every available
decision (published or unpublished) by both district and appellate courts applying the
PSLRA to a motion to dismiss from the beginning of 1996 through the end of 2002. Our
searches yielded 213 total decisions from these circuits. We then excluded all but the last
available decision in the sample for each lawsuit, leaving 155 decisions; 66 of these are
from the Second Circuit and 89 are from the Ninth. Of these, the circuit court decided 9
of the cases from the Second Circuit and 11 for the Ninth Circuit; the remainder of the
decisions are from the district court level.
We chose these two circuits for our study because they are the leading circuits for
the filing of securities class actions. In addition, they are generally recognized as falling
at two ends of the pleading spectrum on securities claims. As discussed above, the courts
have adopted very different approaches to interpreting and applying the pleading
provisions of the PSLRA. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the most stringent interpretation
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of that provision in its Silicon Graphics decision, requiring plaintiffs to plead that
defendants were “deliberately reckless” in making the misstatements alleged to be
fraudulent. 53 Not surprisingly, courts adopting higher standards appear somewhat more
likely to dismiss claims. 54 In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s percentage of all securities
class action filings has declined subsequent to that decision, suggesting plaintiffs’
lawyers prefer to litigate elsewhere. 55 Focusing on these two circuits allows us look more
carefully at how the different standards applied in the two circuits affect different kinds
of allegations.
We collected the data for each of the variables from the opinions resolving the
motions to dismiss or the complaints themselves. We restrict our study to these data
sources because the purpose of our analysis is to study the judicial implementation of the
PSLRA and the factors that influence those judicial decisions. Thus, our study focuses
on the cases as presented to the judge. Our variables abstract from the picture presented
to the judges, however, in that they do not capture the relative strength of the allegations
as they are found in the complaints.

Allegations of insider trading may vary in

credibility, for example, depending on whether the insider trading alleged is unusual in
amount or timing. 56 This simplification is necessary to make data collection tractable,
but it excludes some data that could affect our results.
It is also important to note that the revenue recognition variables are coded
53

In re Silicon Graphics Securities Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 629, 716-736 (2002). Stock prices in
the high tech sector rose after the Silicon Graphics decis ion, possibly indicating that investors believed that
the standard would make it more difficult to sue these companies. Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson &
A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 So. Cal. L. Rev. 276 (2000).
55
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 913,
944-947.
54
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according to the most serious allegation contained in the complaint. So a complaint that
includes an allegation the firm restated its revenues will be coded as 0 for the other
revenue recognition category, even if the complaint includes revenue recognition
allegations other than the restatement. By contrast, if a complaint contains an allegation
that a company improperly recognized revenues as well as violating other accounting
principles, it is coded as a 1 for both accounting categories. With these caveats in mind,
the variables are defined as follows:

56

See Sale, Judging Heuristics, supra note ___, at 926-31.
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Variable

Dismissed

Definition

Predicted
Direction

Coded as 1 if the case is dismissed in its entirety, with or
without prejudice, and 0 if any of the allegations are not
dismissed.

RestateRevRec Coded as 1 if complaint alleges that the firm restated
prior revenues, 0 otherwise.

−

RevRec

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges that the firm
deceptively recognized revenues, but without a
restatement, 0 otherwise.

?

OtherGAAP

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges violations of
generally accepted accounting principles other than
revenue recognition, 0 otherwise.

?

InsTrade

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges insider trading, 0
otherwise.

+

Offering

Coded as 1 if the complaints alleges that the company
offered securities (debt or equity), 0 otherwise.

−

Merger

Coded as 1 if the complaint alleges that the company
merged or was contemplating a merger, 0 otherwise.

−

FwdLooking

Coded as 1 if complaint includes an allegation of a false
forward-looking statement, 0 otherwise.

+

’33 Act

Coded as 1 if complaint includes a claim for violations of
Sections 11 or 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 0
otherwise.

?

Milberg

Coded as 1 if Milberg Weiss is class counsel, 0
otherwise.

?

Circuit

Coded as 1 for the Ninth Circuit, 0 for Second Circuit.

+

Table 1, Panel A shows the time-series distribution of the decisions by circuit.
Given that our sample consists of the last reported decision during the sample period,
there is a substantial lag from the time of the enactment of the PSLRA for the decisions.
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Table 1, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample, as well as both
circuits, showing the percentage of the sample having the coded outcome or allegation.
Panel B also presents tests for differences between the two subsamples.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Decisions By Year
1996
th
9

nd

2
Outcome
Dismissal
Denial

0
0

0
0

1997
nd
th
2
9
1
1

1
2

1998
th
9

nd

2

3
4

10
8

1999
th
9

nd

2

6
5

6
3

2000
9th

nd

2

6
15

13
9

2001
th
9

nd

2

4
9

9
3

2002
th
9

nd

2

4
8

17
8

Total
th
9

nd

2

24
42

56
33

Panel B: Outcomes and Allegations
Both (N = 155)
Variable
Dismissed
RestateRevRec
RevRec
OtherGAAP
InsTrade
Offering
Merger
FwdLooking
33 Act
Milberg
Circuit

2nd Cir. (N = 66)

52%
16%
22%
32%
50%
28%
34%
42%
17%
59%
57%

36%
17%
18%
35%
38%
42%
33%
32%
27%
44%

9th Cir. (N = 89)
63%
15%
25%
30%
58%
18%
35%
49%
10%
70%

Chi Square (P-value)
10.703 (0.001)
0.123 (0.726)
0.946 (0.331)
0.353 (0.552)
6.401(0.011)
11.141 (0.001)
0.038 (0.846)
4.832 (0.028)
7.758 (0.005)
10.344 (0.001)

Significant differences (at the 5% level) are in bold
The most striking difference in the table is the great discrepancy in percentage of
motions granted. The Second Circuit courts granted 36% of motions to dismiss, and the
Ninth Circuit courts granted 63%. 57 The difference is strongly significant. This statistic
provides some support for the view that the Ninth Circuit is a tougher forum in which to
bring to securities fraud class actions. This raw measure does not control, however for
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the content of complaints. It is possible (although not readily explainable) that plaintiffs’
lawyers bring systematically weaker claims in the Ninth Circuit. 58
Consistent with the results of prior work, we find that accounting violations are
common allegations in the complaints in our sample. Revenue recognition allegations
appear in 38% of the complaints, and allegations of violations of other accounting
principles appear in nearly a third. There is no statistically significant difference between
the two circuits for any of the accounting allegation variables.
Insider trading allegations, however, are different. Allegations of insider trading
are significantly more likely to appear in Ninth Circuit complaints, likely reflecting the
importance of options as a form of compensation in the high tech sector.
The other allegations vary. Offering appears significantly more often in Second
Circuit complaints, reflecting New York’s preeminence as an investment banking center.

57

The circuit court decisions are roughly consistent with these overall numbers in the Second Circuit, with
the Second Circuit granting dismissal in 3 out of 9 cases. In the Ninth Circuit, however, the appellate court
granted dismissal in 10 out of 11 cases.
58
Given these results and the broad venue provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, one
might expect plaintiffs to file suits in the Second Circuit, rather than the Ninth. See 15 U.S.C. §77v(a), 15
U.S.C. §78aa. However, unlike general litigation, where courts give deference to the plaintiff’s choice of
forum, in class actions and representative litigation like the securities suits studied here, courts give
considerably less weight to that choice. See, e.g., Eades v. Boston Tech., 1996 WL 668403, at * 3 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 13, 1996) (collecting and citing cases). Instead, the key factor is access to sources of proof, like
documents and witnesses. See id. at *5. In securities fraud class actions, it is common for defendants to
seek to transfer the matter out of a district where the “only conection with the litigation [is] the residence of
one or several plaintiffs, to the district containing the corporation’s home office, where many of the
relevant documents and witnesses are generally found in cases of this type.” Bolton v. Tesoro Petroleum
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1312, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Kanbar v. U.S. Healthcare, 715 F. Supp. 602
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (transferring securities fraud and other claims from New York to Pennsylvania where
relevant witnesses, records, and documents were located and allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred).
In addition, according to a recent study of securities fraud complaints, most suits are filed in the
state where the issuer is headquartered. See Robert B. Thompson and Hillary A. Sale, Study of 1999
Securities Fraud Complaints (2004) (copy on file with authors) (of 83 complaints filed against U.S.
headquartered firms in the Ninth, Second, and Third Circuits in 1999, 88% were filed in state of issuer’s
headquarters). Moreover, California was the headquarters for half of the companies in the sample. Yet,
California has only about 15% of the American company headquarters. Robert B. Thompson and Hillary
A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859 n.
164 (2003). But, in securities fraud litigation, companies in the high technology industry are sued more
often than others and that is consistent with California headquartered firms dominating the group in the
Thompson and Sale study and here. Id. at 891.
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Merger appears in about a third of the complaints in each circuit. Forward- looking
statements are more likely to be alleged in Ninth Circuit complaints, and the Milberg firm
is more prominently represented in that circuit, appearing in more than two-thirds of the
cases there. 59 The Second Circuit has a significantly higher percentage of ’33 Act claims,
which appear in slightly less than a fifth of the cases overall.

B.

Regression results
We now turn to the results of our multivariate regressions. We use logistic

regression analysis with the outcome of the motion to dismiss as our dependent variable.
The outcome is coded 1 if the case is dismissed in its entirety, with or without prejudice,
and 0 if any of the allegations are not dismissed. Consequently, positive regression
coefficients are correlated with dismissal and negative coefficients correlate with motions
that are denied. The regression results are reported in Table 2.
Table 2
Regression Results

Variable

Prediction

Both
Coeff. p-value

Both
Coeff. p-value

2nd Circuit
Coeff. p-value

9th Circuit
Coeff. p-value

Intercept

?

-0.330

0.425

-0.313

0.597

0.341

0.547

RestateRevRec

-0.376

0.516

-2.003

0.100

0.414

0.587

-0.007

0.988

-1.455

0.128

1.002

0.141

-0.905

0.024

-1.531

0.039

-0.860

0.118

0.996

0.017

1.470

0.071

1.336

0.019

0.062

0.890

-0.216

0.773

0.185

0.780

0.326

0.390

0.404

0.534

0.491

0.344

-0.834

0.047

-2.231

0.011

-0.331

0.547

33 Act

–
?
?
+
–
–
+
?

-0.655

0.207

0.654

0.429

-1.617

0.058

Milberg

?

0.047

0.904

1.385

0.063

-0.615

0.280

Circuit

+

0.982

0.011

RevRec
OtherGAAP
InsTrade
Offering
Merger
FwdLooking

CirRestateRevRec

0.654

0.424

2.418

0.093

59

Although at the time this Article was written, Milberg Weiss had multiple offices, Bill Lerach headed
the firm’s San Diego office.
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CirRevRec

2.457

0.036

CirOtherGAAP

0.671

0.468

-0.134

0.893

CirOffer

0.401

0.689

CirMerger

0.087

0.917

CirFwdLooking

1.900

0.067

Cir33Act

-2.270

0.056

CirMilberg

-2.000

0.033

2

0.191
155

CirInsTrade

Pseudo R
0.123
N
155
Significant coefficients (at the 10% level) are in bold.

0.189
66

0.119
89

Our first regression uses the entire sample and includes Circuit as an independent
variable. We find a positive coefficient on this variable, significant at the 5% level.
These results are consistent with the view that courts in the Ninth Circuit are more likely
to dismiss claims.

This correlation between a tougher standard and an increased

likelihood of dismissal suggests that the legal standard does influence outcomes.
We caution, however, against reading too much into the positive coefficient for
Circuit. If the strength of the allegations in the complaints varies systematically between
the two circuits, then it is possible that the Ninth Circuit is not more demanding.

The

significant coefficient for Circuit does imply, however, that the two circuits may differ in
how they treat different types of allegations. 60
Accordingly, we ran additional regressions using subsamples of the decisions
from each of the circuits in order to control for the possibility that there were structural
differences between the two circuits. In order to assess which variables were affected by
the difference between the two circuits, we also ran an additional regression with the

60

Our results may understate the magnitude of this effect because many of our district court opinions were
decided before the Ninth Circuit adopted its stringent standard in Silicon Graphics in July, 1999, although
the general trend was established in the district courts before that decision. Our sample is therefore
potentially biased against a finding of statistical significance.
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entire sample adding interaction variables to capture the interaction between our
independent variables and the circuit. 61
1.

Type of allegation

In the Second Circuit regression, the accounting variables RestRevRec and
RevRec and OtherGAAP each have the predicted negative sign.

The two revenue

recognition variables approach statistical significance at the 10% level and these
coefficients might prove to be significant with a larger sample size. OtherGAAP is
statistically significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that accounting allegations
correlate with surviving a motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit.
In the Ninth Circuit, by contrast, none of accounting allegations even approach
statistical significance. In our pooled regression, however, we find that the coefficients
for our interaction variables are positive for all three of the accounting variable s, and
significant at the 10% level for the two revenue recognition variables. These results
suggest that the Ninth Circuit is more skeptical of such allegations than the Second
Circuit and is likely to grant a motion to dismiss even when these allegations are present.
The circuits are in accord, however, in their treatment of cases alleging trades by
insiders. As predicted, we find positive and significant (at the 10% level for the Second
Circuit, the 5% level for the Ninth Circuit) coefficients for InsTrade. These coefficients
support Hypothesis 4’s contention that courts are skeptical of the rather noisy signal
provided by such trades. Recall that these trades are pleaded in many complaints and that
the presence of options as a form of pay is likely to increase trades by insiders, and,
thereby, the possibility of including them in pleadings.

61

The coefficients for the other independent variables are not reported here as they are identical to the
coefficients for the regression using the Second Circuit subsample.
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Our other variables intended to capture motive to engage in fraud, Offering and
Merger, are consistently insignificant. We can conclude little from this result. It is
possible that motive-based allegations like offerings, mergers, and trades are not
particularly persuasive to the courts (nor are they particularly unpersuasive, as insider
trading appears to be) but a larger sample size might show a different result.
2. Legal Standards
The coefficient on the FwdLooking variable is significant in the Second Circuit
and the combined sample, but with a negative coefficient, meaning that the variable
relates inversely to dismissal. Thus, the sign on the coefficient is the opposite of the
direction that we predicted with Hypothesis 7. 62 Rather than applying a very rigorous
standard to such allegations and rejecting them, the Second Circuit appears to treat
forward looking statements in a less defendant- friendly manner than we expected.
What explains this anomaly? There are at least two possibilities. The first theory
is that plaintiffs’ lawyers, with the stringent standard for forward-looking statements in
mind, are selective in choosing forecasts and predictions upon which to base suits. When
they allege such statements, they have good information to support their contentions.
The second theory is that judges are skeptical of the high barrier represented by the
PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements, and are therefore reluctant to
vigorously enforce the safe harbor at the pleading stage. Although we cannot resolve
which theory better explains this result, we consider the second less likely. After all,
judges created the pre-PSLRA “bespeaks caution” doctrine without any legislative

62

The Ninth Circuit coefficient for this variable is insignificant. We note, however, that the interaction
variable for this coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting the Ninth Circuit is more skeptical of
such allegations.
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prodding. The PSLRA’s safe harbor is simply an additional step in the development of
that doctrine.
Our last variable relating to the effect of legal standards on outcomes is ’33 Act.
This coefficient is significant (at the 10% level) with the predicted negative, nondismissal, sign in the Ninth Circuit, but is insignificant in the Second Circuit (with a
positive sign), despite the greater prevalence of such claims in that circuit. Thus, courts
within the Ninth Circuit are less likely to dismiss ‘33 Act claims than their Second
Circuit counterparts. In our regressions for the combined sample, the coefficient for the
interaction variable for Circuit and ’33 Act is significant and negative, further supporting
the proposition that the Ninth Circuit is more hospitable to such claims. We conclude
that our findings support the hypothesis that Securities Act claims are more likely to be
treated as non- fraud claims in the Ninth Circuit.

3. Identity of Counsel
Our final variable, Milberg, has a negative but insignificant coefficient in the
Ninth Circuit, but a positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) coefficient in
the Second Circuit. Thus, these results indicate a correlation between dismissal and the
presence of the Milberg firm in the Second Circuit. The interaction variable for Circuit
and Milberg is negative and significant (at the 10% level), suggesting either that Second
Circuit courts treat the firm’s complaints with greater skepticism or the firm brings
weaker complaints in that circuit.

IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
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The decision to file a lawsuit and the drafting of the complaint is an art, not a
science. The landscape of securities fraud litigation changed dramatically in 1995 when
Congress passed the PSLRA. That legislation overhauled many of the procedural and
pleading aspects of securities fraud class actions, leaving the standards for making such
claims highly uncertain.

Notwithstanding this uncertainty, our findings suggest that

social science may be able to offer insights to class action attorneys who are making
filing decisions. Our study of motion to dismiss opinions since the passage of the
PSLRA also suggests that the reforms have had an important impact on certain types of
allegations commonly found in securities fraud complaints.
The first key reform is the heightened pleading standard. Although we do not
take a position here on which circuit, the Second or the Ninth, has adopted the “correct”
standard, the results of our regression analysis suggests that the standard may make a
difference in outcomes. The Ninth Circuit declared its intent to adopt a standard more
stringent than the Second Circuit’s, and plaintiffs are now more likely to see their cases
dismissed in that circuit.
But the actua l knowledge standard required for forward- looking statements does
not appear as formidable in the courts as it might in the statute books. Holding other
allegations constant, complaints raising such claims tend to survive. We speculate that
this may be due to increasingly specific pleading by the plaintiffs, but our statistical
analysis does not permit us to say more. It is also possible that judges are skeptical of the
fact that the actual knowledge requirement applies to pleadings as well as at trial. 63
One of the most interesting aspects of our study is how the heightened pleading
standard plays out with respect to specific types of allegations. The Second Circuit
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appears to find allegations of accounting violations more persuasive than does the Ninth
Circuit. Of course, it is possible that complaints brought in the Second Circuit have
stronger evidence of accounting wrongdoing.
The motive-based allegations find a mixed response in the courts. Trades by
insiders are unpersuasive in both circuits, and the merger and offering coefficients are
consistently insignificant. Finally, the Milberg Weiss firm faces more of a struggle in
courts within the Second Circuit than in the Ninth. The difference in the firm’s results
between the two circuits may be driven by intra- firm differences as much as variations in
approach by the courts.
In conclusion, our findings make clear that the law does matter. To date, the most
significant obstacle to class actions is the heightened pleading standard, rather than the
special forward- looking statement standard.

Our results also present interesting

possibilities for future study. The strongest regression results are those resulting from the
application of the heightened pleading standard to allegations intended to show
knowledge or motive. Plaintiffs with accounting allegations are more likely to survive a
motion to dismiss in the Second Circuit; the Ninth Circuit appears more skeptical of such
claims. We would hypothesize that in the wake of Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia and other
accounting scandals, those allegations will continue to carry weight with the courts, and
that attitudes in the Ninth Circuit courts may shift. And given the media and academic
focus on the role options appeared to play in today’s corporate governance scandals, it
will be interesting to see whether the courts will reconsider their apparently hostile
attitude toward claims alleging trades by insiders as a basis for scienter. Over time, of
course, plaintiffs’ lawyers may also refine their use of such allegations to mirror more
63

See infra note __ and accompanying text.
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closely judicial doctrine. Thus, the cases decided in the next few years may reveal a shift
in the courts’ perspectives on what counts as fraud.

30

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2003

31

